

Statement of Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) on the UNDP project in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh

Introduction

On 14th June, 2003 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) inaugurated the field office of the *Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility* (CHTDF) at Rangamati to operate the UNDP project: *'Promotion of Development and Confidence-building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts'* aiming at “ (a) facilitating resumption of substantial international development assistance to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) which was lastly suspended in February 2001 as a result of a serious kidnapping incident in the CHT and (b) support the formulation and start-up of a multi-sectoral Development Support Programme in the CHT which will be funded by UNDP and other donor institutions. The first objective will be promoted by the creation of a CHT Development Facility with modest offices in Dhaka and Rangamati, while the second objective will be pursued by the elaboration of various project initiatives aimed at (i) institution-building support to all relevant CHT institutions, (ii) community development pilot schemes at the grass-roots level in the CHT, and (iii) confidence building measures to strengthen communal harmony and cooperation in the CHT.” But, the project has created controversy whether it is consistent with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997 and the UNDP’s policy on indigenous peoples or not.

This project has been undertaken in accordance with the report of *Joint GoB/Donor Risk Assessment Mission on the Chittagong Hill Tracts* fielded in June 2002. It is mentionable here that almost all concerned of the CHT people reacted against this report as, the report is biased and has reflected the government’s policy on CHT.

It is a well established fact that the permanent residents, particularly the Jumma people have been deprived and neglected by all successive governments for a long time. The CHT people have never been consulted and involved in the low-scale development that has taken place so far in the past and a top down approach has been imposed as a result of hostile national policy, wrong development approach, political conflict and instability for more than two decades in the region.

Following the signing of the CHT Accord in December 1997, between the government of Bangladesh (GoB) and PCJSS, a favourable atmosphere has been created for initiating sustainable development interventions in the CHT. Therefore, the PCJSS and concerned others have been urging upon the donor community and funding institutions to take development initiatives ensuring acceptability to the local people of CHT through involving them in development activities. It has been observed that many donor appraisal missions consulted and involved the Jumma and CHT people actively. Hence, it is expected that this UNDP process would also include a participatory and transparent approach actively involving the three Hill District Councils and the CHT Regional Council.

It is needless to say that the proper implementation of the CHT Accord is the only pre-condition for any sustainable development work in CHT and there is no alternative of local councils and special administrative system for ensuring good governance. Proper implementation of CHT Accord such as executing of CHT Regional Council (CHTRC) and three Hill District Council (HDC) Acts, withdrawal of security forces from their temporary camps to three cantonments and three district headquarters camps, disposal of land disputes through the Land Commission, rehabilitation of returnee Jumma refugees, internally displaced Jumma people, ex-combatants of the PCJSS and etc. are the most urgent issues to be resolved immediately.

Soon after signing the CHT Accord in 1997 the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) initiated consultation with development partners. For this purpose, GoB and the donors decided to form a Joint GoB-Donor Working Group at the meeting held on 22 February 1998. The Working Group was assigned with the responsibility of identifying the possibility and requirement of immediate and medium support projects in CHT. Meanwhile, the UNDP had been entrusted with the responsibility for coordination among the donor agencies interested in supporting the implementation of the Accord.

For this purpose a five-member *Need Assessment Mission* was formed. With the financial support of the UNDP the Mission conducted field visit from 5 April to 15 May 1998 and interviewed cross section of people in CHT.

Though the need assessment conducted by the Mission has supported development programmes in CHT as per the CHT Accord, but it has included some recommendations in the report, which are contrary to the Accord. However, it has recommended to undertake short-term confidence-building and quick-response measures to address immediate humanitarian needs and rehabilitation programme for the most affected people.

It is to mention here that the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) has come forward to develop the road, which connects the three Hill District headquarters in response to a PCJSS call in August 1999 in Copenhagen. But, it was unfortunate that on 16 February 2001 three foreign road Engineers of a company employed by the DANIDA namely Mr. Torben Nickolson and Mr. Neelons Hargrad (Danish nationals) and Mr. Tom Shelvey (British national) were abducted by the armed cadres of the United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF) from a point close to an Army camp on Rangamati–Mohalchari road. Following this incident, all donor agencies had postponed their development activities in the CHT sine die.

Joint GoB/Donor Risk Assessment Mission on CHT

Against this backdrop, a Joint GoB/Donor Risk Assessment Mission on CHT was formed in May 2002 with the following objectives:

1. To assess and provide an overview of the risks and the physical safety and security of staff, whether Bangladeshis or expatriates who may visit or be stationed to carry out development related work in the CHT area.
2. To formulate, based on the above assessment, a set of recommendations to the Government of Bangladesh and to the donor community regarding the risks involved, if any, in the resumption of funding of the development activities and the deployment of development personnel in the CHT.

The Risks Assessment Mission was composed of the following personnel;

Government of Bangladesh:

1. Mr. Mahmood Hasan, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
2. Mr. Mohammed Salimullah, Joint Secretary, Ministry on CHT Affairs;
3. GoC, 24 Infantry Division, Chittagong Cantonment
(Brigadier General Mohammed Rafiqul Islam and Col. Quazi Abid-Us-Samad represented him);
4. Mr. Katebur Rahman, Divisional Commissioner, Chittagong;
5. Dr. Zafar Ahmed Khan, Deputy Commissioner, Rangamati
6. Mr. Mujibur Rahman Howlader, Deputy Commissioner, Khagrachari;
7. Mr. Hafizur Rahman Bhuiyan, Deputy Commissioner, Bandarban.

Donor Community:

8. Mr. Michael Heyn, UNDP Consultant and Mission leader;
9. Major General (Retd.) Moin H. Chowdhury, Senior Advisor, Risks & Security;
10. Dr. J. W. Tacco Bottema, Senior Advisor;
11. Prof. Niaz Ahmed Khan, Anthropologist/Public Administration Expert;
12. Mr. J. W. Klassen, Risk Assessment Specialist;
13. Mr. Prasenjit Chakma, Socio-economic Expert.

Observers:

14. Mr. Ove Fritz Larsen, Deputy Head, Embassy of Denmark
15. Mrs. Meriaty Subroto, Programme Officer, Bangladesh Regional Mission, Asian Development Bank, Dhaka and
16. Ms. Marzia Morgiorgi, Poverty Specialist, Asian Development Bank, Manila.

The Mission carried out its risk assessment work in the three Hill Districts from 1 June to 10 June 2002. During their assessment they talked to the authorities of CHTRC, HDCs, civil administration, military, different political parties, NGOs, traditional institutions and civil society including many individuals and leaders both from the Jumma and Bengali community.

Report of the Joint GoB/Donor Risk Assessment Mission on CHT

On 14 August 2002, the Joint GoB/Donor Risk Assessment Mission on CHT launched its report formally. The Foreign Minister Mr. M. Morshed Khan, Home Minister Air Vice-Marshal (Retd) Altaf Hossain Chowdhury, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Riaz Rahaman, Deputy Minister for Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Affairs Mr. Mani Swapan Dewan and Foreign Secretary Mr. Shamser Mobin Chowdhury, Resident Representative of UNDP Mr. Jorgen Lissner and Mr. Michael Heyn delivered their speeches on the occasion.

The Mission report identified Mohalchari Thana (lowest Police administrative area) as the lone 'highly risk zone'. Out of 27 Thanas, four Thanas namely – Guimara, Ramgarh, Kawkhali and Naniarchar were marked as 'medium risk-zone' and the rest 22 Thanas as 'low risk-zone'. The Mission, in its report expresses the opinion that the CHT has a congenial atmosphere for development and the donor agencies as well as development agencies are called upon for undertaking development programmes in the CHT. On behalf of the donor community, the Resident Representative of UNDP Mr. Jorgen Lissner submitted a 78-page report to the Foreign Minister. To avoid media controversy the UNDP deliberately provided a short report to the media men.

Comments on the Mission's report

The report has eventually given rise to mixed reactions of the concerned quarters of the CHT people. On the positive side, the inhabitants of the CHT have had relieved a sigh with the Mission's recommendation that the CHT has a favourable condition for development. However, the negative points are as follows:

- No representatives from CHTRC, HDCs and traditional institutions had been involved in the mission. Even the government did not consult with these authorities as to the formation of this Mission. On the contrary, three Deputy Commissioners of the three Hill Districts were included in the Mission. As a result, the Mission report could not reflect the exact situation of the CHT. Rather government views and policies on CHT have completely dominated the report. Even, not a single representative from these institutions was invited to the report launching ceremony.
- The risk assessment report was prepared mainly on the basis of the information provided by the military and the police, and hence, the fairness of the report has become controversial. In this regard, it is noteworthy that two members of the Mission are senior army officials. It is needless to say that the role of the army had never been 'fair and positive' towards the Jumma people. Rather the army keeps on twisting the fact of the CHT with an aim in order to cover up their human rights violations and crimes.
- The Mission remains completely silent about the ongoing 'Operation Uttaron' (Operation Upliftment), a kind of military rule conducted by the army as well as withdrawal of more than four hundred temporary military camps to three cantonments and three district headquarters camps as per the CHT Accord of 1997 whereas the Mission justifies the military presence in CHT with the comment: *"the role of the Army is to maintain a stable security environment in the CHT with a view to assisting the GoB and other agencies in implementing the Peace*

Accord.” which is totally absurd and contrary to the provision 17 a of Part- D of CHT Accord, 1997.

- The Mission in its report neither did mention clearly what were the causes of ‘unrest and risk’ in the CHT, nor did it identify who were responsible for abduction of three foreign nationals. Rather, it recognised the unrest situation as an outcome of ‘internal conflict’ between the regional political parties. The mission was too diplomatic to admit sincerely the facts denying the negative role of the military-backed UPDF, which showed that the Mission had been fairly sympathetic to UPDF.
- The Mission purposefully attempted to tarnish the image of the PCJSS and its members. It identified Mohalchari Thana as ‘high risk-zone’ and recommended for not to undertake any development programme there. Moreover, with an ulterior motive the Mission highlighted Mr. Suddha Sindhu Khisa, Member, Central Committee, PCJSS and Member of the CHT Regional Council as the PCJSS leader of Mohalchari Thana. In this respect, it is to mention here that the army from Mohalchari Thana headquarters demolished Mr. Khisa’s house in April - May 1979 (from 29th April to 13th May). Since then Mr. Khisa, along with his family members, was compelled to leave Mohalchari area and after signing the Accord, since February 1998, he has been living with his family members at Khagrachari town. The report undermined his status and tactfully held him responsible for the situation that led Mohalchari Thana to high risk-zone.

It is unfortunate that the Mission’s report put a label on PCJSS, the only political party of the CHT Jumma peoples who fought for more than two decades for reestablishing the rights of Jumma people and signed an Accord with the government, as terrorist and extortionist.

- The Mission recommends for setting up a ‘Risk Management Unit’ (RMU) within the CHTDF field office in Rangamati and going to command by two senior military officials who will regularly collect information and manage risk situation through the volunteers of the RMU. UN volunteers, national volunteers and local volunteers will be involved in this process. The CHT people do remember the heinous role of the members of the ‘Terrorism Resistance Committee’, ‘Peoples’ Resistance Committee’ and etc. floated by the military authority basically against the PCJSS and the CHT movement as well. Arrest, torture and even killing were simple acts of these military-backed gangs upon the innocent people which are still vivid in the memory of the Jumma people. Therefore, there is every possibility of bringing unhealthy situation among the communities and develop mistrust in lieu of confidence building.

In fact, overall development in CHT mainly depends on the proper implementation of CHT Accord. However, the Mission has overlooked the following important points:

Land dispute is the main problem of the CHT, which is turning from bad to worse day-by-day as the settlers have been increasingly grabbing lands of the Jumma people. On the other hand, the government is not letting the Land Commission function and deal with this serious issue. The military role is still very dominant in all respects of CHT affairs. They are aggravating the situation of CHT in their own interest to justify their presence in the CHT. Human rights violations by the military still goes unabated in the region. Therefore, the withdrawal of more than four hundred temporary military camps under the provision of CHT Accord is a pre-condition to stop persecutions by the army. The functioning of HDCs by nominated representatives of the ruling parties for years together, lack of sustainable development programmes, lack of government’s cohesive role with CHT Regional Council to exercise its power and function of supervision and coordination over general administration, law and order and all development activities in CHT region and etc. have been ignored by the Mission.

Due to these reasons including the non-implementation of the major provisions of CHT Accord, the situation of the CHT has been deteriorating to a great extent. But the Mission, in its report, has ignored all these fundamental issues. However, the Mission report should have identified that the total

and proper implementation of CHT Accord should be the most important pre-condition for development in CHT region.

In the light of above facts, it can be said that the Joint GOB/Donor Risk Assessment Mission on CHT did not recognise basic issues rather it had echoed the views and policies of the government. However, it is unfortunate for the people of CHT that GoB and UNDP are going to start their so called development activities on the basis of Mission report in an arrogant manner. But PCJSS strongly believes that the Mission report has related the unrest situation of the CHT to the 'internal conflicts' between the regional political parties, which is an unjust attempt of the Mission to unburden the government of its patronisation of the UPDF's terrorist acts and justify military presence in the CHT. The PCJSS also strongly believes that the Mission was not at all conscience-stricken to look into the state of the Jumma people as well as the permanent Bengali residents who have been victims of series of conspiracies hatched by the army, vested quarters of the government and the settlers from outside CHT.

UNDP's ongoing project

On the basis of the preparatory and pilot project "*Promotion of Development and Confidence-building in CHT*" a **Quick Impact Fund** has been established for this project. The estimated cost of the project is US \$ 2,000,000. The fund will be dedicated primarily to providing small grants (a 300,000 Taka ceiling per Para Community) to 500 Para Communities named 'Para Development Committee'. Emphasis will be on small-scale projects aimed at initiating early action and visible result. Initially total 6 Upazilas (2 Upazilas from each Hill District) and 120 Paras (20 Paras from each Upazila) will be taken for these pilot projects. Already Rangamati Sadar and Bilaichari Upazilas from Rangamati Hill District, Bandarban Sadar and Thanchi Upazilas from Bandarban Hill District have been unanimously selected by the District Project facilitation Teams. But, the Khagrachari Project Facilitation Team ended its meeting on 29th May without any decision because of difference in opinions and biased convening of the meeting. But, this is unfortunate that the Director, CHTDF thanked the CHTRC Chairman on 11th June for his cooperation with nomination of six CHTRC representatives for which he could select six Upazillas including Matiranga and Khagrachari.

It has been unrealistic and a motivated act for bringing Matiranga Upazilla under the project which is completely dominated by Bengali settlers on the Jumma people's ancestral lands who have been waiting for getting back lands once the Land Commission starts functioning. The CHTDF postponed the selection of Matiranga Upazilla after a sheer criticism by Mr. Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, Chairman of CHT Regional Council on 14th June when he was delivering his inaugural speech at the inauguration of the CHTDF. The Director, CHTDF informed the Chairman, Khagrachari Hill District Council that he would visit Khagrachari for the selection of the unselected Upazilla. But, on 10th July Matiranga Upazilla was selected in a meeting convened by the Deputy Minister, Ministry on the CHT Affairs in presence of the UNDP acting Resident Representative and the Director, CHTDF.

On 14 June 2003 the UNDP officially started development activities in the CHT through an launching programme of field office of Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF) at Rangamati. During this launching program, Mr. Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, Chairman of CHT Regional Council and President of Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) was present as Chief Guest. Mr. Mani Swapan Dewan, the Deputy Minister for CHT Affairs, Dr. Manik Lal Dewan, Chairman of Rangamati Hill District Council, Ms. Ma Mya Ching, Chairman of Bandarban Hill District Council and Raja Devasish Roy, Circle Chief of Chakma Circle were present as special guests while Mr. Jorgen Lissner, the UN Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP in Dhaka, Bangladesh presided over this launching programme and Mr. Michael Heyn, Director of CHTDF delivered the welcome address.

Comments on the project

From the very beginning, a lot of questions have been raised regarding the project, particularly, whether it is consistent with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997 as well as UNDP's Policy of Engagement on the indigenous peoples or not. The comments raised by the CHT people are as follows:

1. Participation of CHTRC and HDCs:

In the project proposal, nothing is mentioned about the role of CHTRC and HDCs at any level of the project. Whereas according to the CHT Accord and CHT Regional Council Act of 1998 and three Hill District Council Acts of 1989 all developmental works in CHT are to be implemented by the HDCs under the supervision and coordination of CHTRC. Thus, the UNDP ignored the power and function of both CHTRC and HDCs.

2. Generalisation of beneficiaries:

In 'target beneficiaries' section of this project proposal, it was declared that "In line with basic principles of the United Nations, the benefits of the project will be accessible to all population groups in the CHT, irrespective of their ethnic origin or residence status". Based on these criteria, this project has included outsider Bengali settlers (transmigrated population in order to make the indigenous Jumma people a minority in their own homeland) as target beneficiaries. Whereas CHT Accord, CHT Regional Council Act and Hill District Council Acts have recognised CHT as predominantly tribal (official term) inhabited region and also recognised the need for preserving the unique characteristics of this region and attaining the overall development there of. In order to preserve the unique characteristic of this region there is a provision in the Accord and Acts for preparing voter list only with permanent residents of the CHT. Moreover, the Accord has a provision for giving back the indigenous Jumma people's lands which were forcibly grabbed by the Bengali settlers with the help of military and Bengali dominated civil bureaucracy. Thus, by giving Bengali settlers a chance of access to the benefit of this project, it will go a long way to undermine the spirit of CHT Accord to a large extent which will ultimately be a dangerous step to the very existence of the indigenous Jumma people in their own home land.

Therefore, this project must be for the benefit of Jumma peoples and permanent Bengali residents of CHT. Among them, returnee Jumma refugees, internally displaced Jumma families, ex- combatants of PCJSS and landless and poor people who live below poverty line deserve to get top priority under this development programme. The criteria set by UNDP can never be a rationale to give the settlers a chance of access to the benefit. Because, they have committed series of massacres upon the Jumma peoples and grabbed the ancestral lands of the Jummas with the full backing of the government in order to exterminate the Jumma people from their homeland (CHT). The most important demand of the CHT people is that the settlers should be rehabilitated outside CHT in their original home districts with due honour and generous support and UNDP could play an important historic role in this regard. It is also a fact that a big number of them are willing to go back to their home districts if they are supported by a resettlement programme.

3. Goal of the development:

It is stated in the UNDP's project that poverty reduction is the overarching goal of development. It is needless to say that the Jumma people have been deprived of development for a long time. As a result, the poverty is an acute problem of the Jumma people. This is why, it is an emergency task to undertake programme against poverty. But, side-by-side, it is also a fact that the overall situation in CHT would not improve and favourable atmosphere would not exist for smooth and people-oriented development activities if the CHT Accord is not implemented properly. Hence, development activities should be in support of the implementation of CHT Accord.

It should be borne in mind that without proper rehabilitation of the displaced Jumma people who have been uprooted from their ancestral lands due to series of violence and atrocities committed by the security forces and Bengali settlers, the development activities cannot be sustainable. Particularly, keeping more than 100,000 families of internally displaced Jumma people without rehabilitation and keeping 3,055 repatriated Jumma families off their ancestral lands and 40 villages of Jumma people under the illegal occupation of Bengali settlers and military- no development programme would be

fruitful. Therefore, rehabilitation of the displaced Jumma families, returnee Jumma refugees, ex-combatants of PCJSS, hundreds of forest villagers, Jum cultivators, landless Jumma families and permanent Bengali residents who were affected by the Karnaphuly Hydroelectric Project must be given the top most priority in development initiatives instead of this poverty reduction measure.

4. UNDP and Indigenous Peoples: A Policy of Engagement

The UNDP has enshrined a responsibility on indigenous peoples through its policy "UNDP and Indigenous Peoples: A Policy of Engagement". It has declared that 'By incorporating the "right to development" in its work, UNDP fosters the full participation of indigenous peoples in its development processes and the incorporation of Indigenous Perspectives in development planning and decision-making. This right is of particular significance to indigenous peoples because in their experience, development has tended to be imposed upon their communities from outside, often resulting in violations of their "right to development", by damaging ancestral lands, water and natural resources.' (Paragraph 27).

It has further declared that 'For projects involving indigenous peoples and any project that may affect indigenous peoples, consultation should include representatives from local and regional IPOs, ensure gender and generational balance (elders and youth), and use culturally appropriate methods that allow indigenous peoples to express their views and preferences.' (Paragraph 60).

'Social and environmental impact assessments prior to programme and project implementation are recommended to safeguard against potential negative effects on indigenous peoples, their communities and livelihoods' (Paragraph 62).

Unfortunately, the participation of Jumma peoples and the local institutions have not been ensured and the indigenous perspectives have not been incorporated in the planning and decision-making of this project. Therefore, it amounts to a clear denial of the political and land rights of the Jumma people in their own homeland.

The principles of Free, Prior and Informed Consent have not been followed by UNDP. Although it is clearly stated in its Policy of Engagement that "Consistent with United Nations conventions such as ILO Convention 169, UNDP promotes and supports the right of indigenous peoples to free, prior informed consent with regards to development planning and programming that may affect them" (para 28). Unfortunately, the Jumma peoples, CHTRC and HDCs are not well informed of the contents of the project and its possible impacts etc. Even, the full and detailed project proposal of UNDP was not supplied to CHTRC and HDCs beforehand. As a result of repeated attempt to have the total content of the project, UNDP supplied only concept document of the project only to the CHTRC so far. It is mentionable that the report of the Joint GoB/Donor Risk Assessment Mission on CHT has not been also supplied to the people and organizations concerned. So, it is a clear violation of the principles of Free, Prior and Informed Consent as declared by the ILO Convention.

The UNDP's Indigenous Peoples Policy of Engagement has furthermore declared that "Through its human rights approach to development and governance, and working together with Governments, CSOs and IPOs, UNDP promotes the recognition of indigenous rights to lands, territories and resources, laws protecting indigenous lands; and the inclusion of indigenous peoples in key legislative processes. (Paragraph 29). The UNDP Human Rights Policy recognizes the rights of distinct peoples living in distinct regions to self-determined development and control of ancestral land. This embraces a concept of development that incorporates indigenous peoples' own aspirations, spirituality, culture social and economic aims" (Paragraph 30).

If the settlers are recognised as the target beneficiaries and local institutions are not actively involved then it will be nothing but a violation of the CHT Accord, special characteristic and special administrative system of this "tribe-inhabited region". It will be weekend the recognition of indigenous rights to lands, territories and resources. It is mentionable that on the national context based on national policy the Jumma people are significantly weak and backward section of people in the country. They are totally different from the rest of the Bengali people of Bangladesh in all respects such as ethnically, socially, economically, politically, culturally and religiously. The CHT is a land for eleven indigenous peoples namely Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Mro, Bawm, Pankhua, Khiang, Khumi,

Chak, Lushai, Tanchangya. If the Bengali settlers are recognised as beneficiaries of the project, the UNDP's Indigenous Peoples' policy of recognising the rights of distinct peoples living in distinct regions to self-determined development and control of ancestral land will be violated in toto.

Conclusion

The UN is the only international organisation, which is recognised by the people of the world as promoter and protector of human rights as well as indigenous peoples' rights. Naturally, the indigenous Jumma peoples and permanent Bengali residents of the CHT expect that the UN and UNDP, the UN specialised agency, would come forward to establishing their rights, of course, not at the cost of undermining the clauses of the CHT Accord achieved through a long struggle of two and a half decades.

That is why it is an urgent need to undertake participatory and transparent development initiatives in line with the CHT Accord. Hence, the people of the CHT will welcome such initiative to be undertaken by UNDP and at the same time will disown imposed and wrong development. So, the PCJSS, on behalf of the CHT people, call upon the UNDP to respond on the basis of the following recommendations:

1. To undertake all UNDP projects in accordance with the letter and spirit of the CHT Accord;
2. To make the indigenous peoples and permanent Bengali residents as the only beneficiaries of the projects;
3. To ensure full and effective participation of CHTRC and HDCs at all levels of the projects;
4. To undertake development programmes adopting the UN principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent of the indigenous peoples and permanent Bengalis;
5. To scrape the Risk Management Unit and
6. To change objectionable points of the Risks Assessment Mission's Report.

This statement is circulated by Information and Publicity Department of PCJSS from its Central Office, Kalyanpur, Rangamati, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh in July 2003. Tel: +880-351-61246. E-mail: pcjss@hotmail.com